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The concept of asymmetrical warfare is a popular and
much discussed issue in U.S. defense literature these days.
Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), and the National Military Strategy (NMS)
are just a few of the documents that express concern about
it. Understandably, the Secretary of Defense has made
addressing the phenomenon a central theme of his
administration.
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All of that said, what exactly is meant by asymmetrical
warfare? In broad terms it simply means warfare that seeks
to avoid an opponent’s strengths; it is an approach that tries
to focus whatever may be one side’s comparative
advantages against its enemy’s relative weaknesses. In a
way, seeking asymmetries is fundamental to all
warfighting. But in the modern context, asymmetrical
warfare emphasizes what are popularly perceived as
unconventional or nontraditional methodologies.
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For most potential adversaries, attacking the United
States asymmetrically is the only warfighting strategy they
might reasonably consider for the foreseeable future. The
Gulf War was an object lesson to military planners around
the globe of the futility of attempting to confront the United
States symmetrically, that is, with like forces and orthodox
tactics.
In this essay I briefly examine how the West’s cultural
disposition and mindset affect its concept of asymmetrical
warfare. I contend that the West’s current focus may leave it
vulnerable to asymmetrical challenges that arise from
opponents whose cultural perspective differs significantly
from that of the West.
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Technology-Oriented Asymmetries.
In the West in general, and America in specific,
asymmetrical warfare is frequently conceived in
technological terms. JV 2010 states, for example, that “our
most vexing future adversary may be one who can use
technology to make rapid improvements in its military
capabilities that provide asymmetrical counters to US
military strengths. . . .” Unsurprisingly, therefore, weapons
of mass destruction and information warfare are often
proffered as illustrations of the asymmetrical warfare
genre.
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The technological orientation of the Western mindset is
to be expected. In his book, On the Origins of War, Donald
Kagan writes that the scientific revolution ongoing since the
16th century has had a profound effect on the West. As a
result, he maintains,
It is a special characteristic of the modern Western world, as
opposed to other civilizations and the premodern Western
world, to believe that human beings can change and control
the physical and social environment and even human nature.8

In due course, faith in the efficacy of technology and
scientific methodology invaded thinking about warfare.
That technology proved important to the military
dominance of the West for over a century only reinforces the
idea that it will continue to drive military success in the
future.
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Furthermore, focusing on technology reflects the
quintessential American approach to waging war.
Historians Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski declare
that since the mid-19th century (but particularly in the
20th century) the United States has relied upon
“increasingly sophisticated technology to overcome
logistical limitations . . . and to match enemy numbers with
firepower.” This emphasis comports with America’s
sense of itself. The comments of General George S. Patton,
Jr., typify the classic American view:
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The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics of the
world. . . . It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war
which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war
by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of
our ability.11

This concentration on technology continues today. JV
2010, the “operationally based template” as to how
America will fight future wars, centers on the question of
how to “leverage technological opportunities to achieve new
levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.” Clearly, the
American “mindset” (if not that of the West generally) tends
to see all difficulties—even the complex challenge of
war—as technical problems subject to engineered
solutions.
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Culturally-Oriented Asymmetries.
War does, of course, present technical problems but is
not itself one. It is instead a contest of human wills that
transcends the logic of the physical sciences. Importantly, it
is also more than simply a violent form of a Westernized
notion of politics. Indeed, the Clauswitzean mantra of the
U.S. defense establishment, i.e., that war is an extension of
politics by other means, has been much deconstructed by
the work of John Keegan and others who address war’s
cultural basis.
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Complementing Keegan’s thesis is that of Samuel
Huntington. He argues that future conflicts will likely be
clashes between civilizations with fundamentally different
psychological orientations and value sets. Huntington
maintains that certain ideas define what it is to be Western,
and therefore add to what might be called the “Western
mindset.” These include such concepts as “individualism,
liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality,
liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the
separation of church and state.”
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What is important about Huntington’s work is that he
reminds us that the rest of the world does not necessarily
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share these values. Thus, we should not expect that they
will think the same way as the West about many subjects,
including warfare. Lieutenant General Li Jijuan of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army recently observed that
“each civilization has its own notion of war which cannot
help but be influenced by its cultural background.”
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Nevertheless, an appreciation for the fact that other
civilizations may look at war from a fundamentally
different perspective is not only unknown to many in the
W est (a n d A mer i c ans es p ec i al l y) but whol l y
counter-intuitive to them. Americans persistently seem to
assume that other peoples think basically the same as they
do. Along these lines, Edward L. Rowney, a retired Army
lieutenant general and former U.S. arms control negotiator,
commented recently that:
Our biggest mistakes stem from the assumption that others
are like us, when in fact, they are more unlike than like us. We
insist on ascribing to others our cultural traits, not recognizing
that we have different objectives due to our unique historic
backgrounds and sets of values. In short, “We fail to place
ourselves in the other person’s moccasins.”18

When this obtuseness towards the mindset of our
adversaries is allowed to affect strategic thinking,
asymmetries result. H. R. McMaster argues in his book,
Dereliction of Duty, for example, that the graduated
application of airpower during the Vietnam War—intended
to signal our resolve to support South Vietnam yet do so in a
way that the United States believed demonstrated
restraint—wholly misperceived North Vietnamese thought
processes. McMaster contends:
Graduated pressure was fundamentally flawed. . . . The
strategy ignored the uncertainty of what was the
unpredictable psychology of an activity that involves killing,
death, and destruction. To the North Vietnamese, military
action, involving as it did attacks on their forces and bombing
their territory, was not simply a means of communication.
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Human sacrifice in war evokes strong emotions creating a
dynamic that defies systems analysis quantification.19

The technological orientation of the Western mindset
along with the assumed universality of Western values
distorts the analysis of asymmetrical warfare. Consider the
potential dangers of technology-based asymmetries. The
West readily examines them because solving that kind of
problem plays to the West’s own notion of its comparative
advantage, i.e., in the areas of weapons innovation and
production. Such perceived “technological” asymmetries
are almost welcomed by the West’s military-industrial
complex.
The much-ballyhooed Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) exemplifies this trend. The RMA seeks to produce
radically more effective militaries through the widespread
application of emerging technologies, especially advanced
computer and communications systems. While it provides
enormous opportunities for sales of new equipment to
Western forces fearful of technological obsolescence, much
of the new weaponry too often seems optimized for
high-tech, peer-competitor war. In other words, it is aimed
principally at a form of warfare that is symmetrical (in
relation to the West) in its essence. In truth, few potential
adversaries will wage symmetrical, high-tech war against
the United States because doing so presents enormous
training, logistical, and resource requirements, and these
are “demands that few societies can meet.”
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The characterization of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as asymmetrical threats is a further manifestation
of the West’s analytical distortion. In truth, the premise
that WMD constitute asymmetrical threats vis-à-vis the
West—at least insofar as inter-state war is concerned—
deserves challenge. Given the West’s still-sizable nuclear
arsenals and its relatively robust capability to deal with
other-than-nuclear WMD warfare, are WMD really
asymmetrical to the West? So long as the West maintains its
current capabilities, it seems rather unlikely that an
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adversary could decisively employ WMD against it. In a very
real sense, using WMD against the United States and other
Western nations would represent an ill-considered attempt
to match the West symmetrically.
The use of WMD in the context of terrorism committed
by non-state actors is, of course, a profound and different
challenge. As serious a problem as terrorism is—especially
when WMD are involved—it is not likely to actually defeat
the West. It does not yet appear that non-state actors could
mount a sufficiently comprehensive attack to physically
vanquish a nation like the United States. Martin Van
Creveld has pointed out that terrorism has never succeeded
in the West because the nature of modernity is that it
provides redundancies that give advanced societies
resiliency against the sort of sporadic attacks that terrorists
carry out, even though individual incidents might be quite
costly.
23

The “Real” Asymmetrical Challenge .
Quite clearly, terrorism principally aims to affect its
targets more psychologically than physically. To that extent
it does suggest the real asymmetrical challenge for the
West. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., the
Commandant of the Army War College, argues that in
future conflicts an enemy may perceive his comparative
advantage against the United States and the West not in
technological terms, but in the “collective psyche and will of
his people.” In turn, this generates an obvious question,
i.e., how will an enemy attack the West’s psyche and will?
The answer makes Americans and others in the West
uncomfortable because it raises the specter that basic
Western values, the very things Huntington sees as
defining the West, are in fact the asymmetries that future
adversaries will most likely seek to exploit.
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The potential asymmetrical vulnerabilities about which
the West should be concerned are not so much technological
as the Western mindset believes (and even prefers), but
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rather are those that turn the fundamentals of the West’s
culture and political system against itself. For example,
among the things that adversaries have learned in the
latter half of the 20th century is to exploit the West’s
democratic system. Consider the remarks of a former North
Vietnamese commander: “The conscience of America was
part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that
power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy;
through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a
will to win.” Thus, by stirring up dissension in the United
States, the North Vietnamese were able to advance their
strategic goal of removing American power from Southeast
Asia.
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More recently, by dragging the body of a U.S. soldier
through the streets of Mogadishu, the Somalis were able to
destroy the public support upon which the United States
and other Western democracies depend upon to sustain
military operations. We should expect such strategies to
proliferate as new communications technologies vastly
enhance the newsgathering and dissemination capabilities
of international media organizations.
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Enemies may perceive vulnerable asymmetries in what
the West views as its virtues. While the mindset in the
United States and the West sees, as JV 2010 says, the
“moral strengths” and the “ethical standards” of its troops
as keys to military power, adversaries willing to abandon
Westernized legal and ethical regimes may well consider
them as things to exploit and manipulate. Increasingly,
opponents will seek to present Western militaries with
moral and ethical conundrums. For example, the Serbs
were able to discourage high-tech NATO air attacks by the
simple expedient of chaining hostage UN troops to potential
targets. The idea of purposely killing friendly troops in
order to destroy an enemy target will be very difficult for
Western forces to rationalize.
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Where once the “Western way of war” meant that
adversaries risked wars often characterized by decisive
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battles where the annihilation of enemy forces was
sought, today we see the emergence of a Western mindset
markedly more sensitive to casualties on both sides.
Enemies may consider this humanitarian concern as yet
another asymmetry on which they can capitalize in ways
the Western mindset considers unthinkable: they may
purposely put their own people in jeopardy if doing do
complicates or adversely affects the West’s use of its
military power.
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Indeed, Somali warlords used women and children as
human shields against coalition forces during the
intervention of the early 1990s. Along similar lines, the
Libyans have threatened to encircle a facility alleged to be
involved with the production of weapons of mass
destruction with “millions of Muslims” in order to deter
attacks by the West. Most recently, when Western
military action seemed imminent, Saddam Hussein
surrounded his palaces and other buildings with
noncombatant civilians (some of whom may have genuinely
volunteered) in order to discourage attacks by Western
forces sensitive to the effect on their publics of civilian
deaths, regardless of the circumstances. Analyst James F.
Du n n ig a n cau tions that “i f the op p onents ar e
bloody-minded enough, they will always exploit the
humanitarian attitudes of their adversaries.”
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Even those opponents—including possible peer
competitors—wh o seek to ac hi eve tec hnol ogi c al
asymmetries over the West may likewise find it profitable to
use our values against us. The West’s free-market, opencompetition economic system encourages innovation and
quickly produces technological advances. But the nature of
that system in a democracy makes turning new ideas into
deploy ed wea pons a c umber s ome and l engthy
process—something extremely worrisome in an age of rapid
technological change.
An adversary less constrained by the political realities of
a capitalistic democracy may be able to gain an

8

asymmetrical advantage by deploying the latest systems
more rapidly than can the bureaucratically-restrained
Western militaries. Author David Shukman explains:
While the Western military struggles for a decade on average to
acquire new weapons, a country with commercially available
computer equipment and less rigorous democratic and
accounting processes could field new systems within a few
years. It is the stuff of military nightmares.35

Parenthetically, it is unlikely that the openness of
democratic societies will allow the achievement of an
asymmetrical advantage via technological surprise against
future adversaries, despite the West’s best efforts. Ephraim
Kam asserts in Surprise Attack that ”since it takes a long
time to produce and deploy new weapons in sufficient
quantities capable of changing the military balance
between nations, information on their characteristics
usually becomes available in the interim.” While many
opponents will lack the resources to develop technologically
superior countermeasures, they may nevertheless be able to
develop low-tech offsets as has been done with some
regularity in the past.
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In fact, an over-emphasis on technology can cause the
West to overlook the many low-tech ways in which
adv ersaries mig ht asymmetr i c al l y r esp ond to
gadgetry-obsessed—and gadgetry-vulnerable—Western
opponents. What is so remarkable about this is that so few
seem to remember the lessons of relatively recent history.
Two senior U.S. military commanders warn against the
siren song of technology in the Autumn 1997 issue of
Parameters. They point out that:
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[Technological] supremacy could not prevent Holland’s defeat in
Indonesia, France’s defeats in Indonesia and Algeria, America’s
defeat in Vietnam, the Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, or
Russia’s more recent defeat in Chechyna. All these episodes
confirm that technological superiority does not automatically
guarantee victory on the battlefield, still less the negotiating
table.38
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Future adversaries may wage asymmetrical warfare by
combining available low-tech equipment with a
culturally-oriented strategy. For example, Marines should
ex pect to face op p onents who d ep l oy r el ati vel y
unsophisticated mines, much as Iraq did during the Gulf
War, in the hopes of replicating the Iraq’s success in
deterring an amphibious assault following damage by
mines to the U.S.S. Tripoli and the U.S.S. Princeton.
Similarly , opponents wi l l l i kel y ac qui r e smal l ,
diesel-powered submarines to present the same threat.
What is important here is that such schemes might not be
able to stop a determined assault, but an adversary may
intend to simply exploit the growing aversion to casualties
in the West’s culture by causing some losses which would, in
turn, erode support for the West’s military effort.
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Surface ships may face an even more insidious threat: an
enemy could use a civilian airliner covertly loaded with
explosives to launch an attack on a high-value target such
as an aircraft carrier. The plane might be flown by a suicide
pilot (or automatically guided) and carry a hostage or even
volunteer group of civilian passengers. Recalling the
recriminations that followed the accidental shootdown of an
Iranian airliner by the cruiser Vincennes, the adversary
may hope to create just enough hesitation on the part of the
ship’s crew to allow the aircraft to successfully penetrate the
defenses. Again, simply causing casualties—in this
scenario both U.S. military personnel and enemy
civilians—would be the aim.
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It is paradoxical that these kinds of enemy actions
against forward deployed American forces might engender
a completely different reaction than acts of terrorism
against the U. S. homeland. Although the objective of both
might be to maximize casualties, the former could succeed
in undermining public support for an overseas operation
while the latter may well evoke a demand for extreme
measures against the perpetrators. Such is the mercurial
nature of contemporary U.S. public opinion.
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In any event, the kind of asymmetrical warfare future
adversaries may wage is not that which seeks to actually
defeat U.S. or Western military forces, but rather that
which assaults the psyche and will of the populations whose
political support is required by Western democracies to
sustain military operations.
Conclusions.
Hopefully, this essay will not be interpreted as an
anti-technology, Luddite manifesto. To the contrary, no
one—least of whom the author—disputes the dictum that
“technology and warfare have never been far apart.”
Moreover, it is unquestionably true that decisionmakers
must be extremely concerned about procuring the finest
technology for U.S. forces. Analysts Ronald Haycock and
Keith Neilson warn that to a great extent military
applications of technology have “permitted the division of
mankind into ruler and ruled.” And it is also still true that
technology is the West’s comparative advantage.
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On e of th e g r eat d anger s , however , i s that
decisionmakers may delude themselves into thinking that
the challenge of asymmetrical warfare is exclusively
technological. It is especially a concern as more and more of
the civilian leadership lack first-hand military experience.
This has led some military officers to worry, as the Wall
Street Journal reported in 1995, that such leaders might
believe that “gadgets can somehow substitute for the blood
and sweat of ground combat.”
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The West must recognize that consideration of war as a
technological or engineering problem has its limits. The
engineer’s culture is an “aggressively rational one” where
technical problems are solved with a logical application of
scientific principles.” War, however, is something
different. Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC,
explains:
45
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Technology permeates every aspect of war, but the science of
war cannot account for the dynamic interaction of the physical
and moral elements that come into play, by design or by
chance, in combat. War will remain predominately an art,
infused with human will, creativity, and judgment.46

What is necessary for the United States and the West is
to expand its assessment of asymmetrical warfare.
Asymmetrical warfare needs to be examined from the
culturally distinct perspective of potential enemies. As
unpleasant as it may be, the West must consider that
enemies may try to turn against us the very values that the
West is seeking to protect. In particular, the United States
and the West must not allow its technologically-oriented
mindset to blind it to the fact that modern war remains, as
already noted, a struggle of psyches and wills.
The West must be prepared to meet the moral as well as
technical challenge of future war. Enemies may concede
that physically defeating the military the forces of the
United States and the West is beyond their capability, but
nevertheless attempt to achieve their war aims by
overcoming the West’s will, testing it in new and innovative
ways. That is the essence of the challenge of asymmetrical
warfare in the 21st century. To the extent that we indulge
ourselves with visions that success in future war can be
reduced to finding high-tech “silver bullets,” all that the
West holds dear is in peril.
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